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Diffstat (limited to 'src/trinityrealm/AuthSocket.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/trinityrealm/AuthSocket.cpp | 975 |
1 files changed, 975 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/trinityrealm/AuthSocket.cpp b/src/trinityrealm/AuthSocket.cpp new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..816a1d32538 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/trinityrealm/AuthSocket.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,975 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005-2008 MaNGOS <http://www.mangosproject.org/> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/** \file + \ingroup realmd +*/ + +#include "Common.h" +#include "Database/DatabaseEnv.h" +#include "ByteBuffer.h" +#include "Config/ConfigEnv.h" +#include "Log.h" +#include "RealmList.h" +#include "AuthSocket.h" +#include "AuthCodes.h" +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include "Auth/Sha1.h" +//#include "Util.h" -- for commented utf8ToUpperOnlyLatin + +extern RealmList m_realmList; + +extern DatabaseType dbRealmServer; + +#define ChunkSize 2048 + +enum eAuthCmd +{ + //AUTH_NO_CMD = 0xFF, + AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE = 0x00, + AUTH_LOGON_PROOF = 0x01, + //AUTH_RECONNECT_CHALLENGE = 0x02, + //AUTH_RECONNECT_PROOF = 0x03, + //update srv =4 + REALM_LIST = 0x10, + XFER_INITIATE = 0x30, + XFER_DATA = 0x31, + XFER_ACCEPT = 0x32, + XFER_RESUME = 0x33, + XFER_CANCEL = 0x34 +}; + +enum eStatus +{ + STATUS_CONNECTED = 0, + STATUS_AUTHED +}; + +// GCC have alternative #pragma pack(N) syntax and old gcc version not support pack(push,N), also any gcc version not support it at some paltform +#if defined( __GNUC__ ) +#pragma pack(1) +#else +#pragma pack(push,1) +#endif + +typedef struct AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE_C +{ + uint8 cmd; + uint8 error; + uint16 size; + uint8 gamename[4]; + uint8 version1; + uint8 version2; + uint8 version3; + uint16 build; + uint8 platform[4]; + uint8 os[4]; + uint8 country[4]; + uint32 timezone_bias; + uint32 ip; + uint8 I_len; + uint8 I[1]; +} sAuthLogonChallenge_C; + +//typedef sAuthLogonChallenge_C sAuthReconnectChallenge_C; +/* +typedef struct +{ + uint8 cmd; + uint8 error; + uint8 unk2; + uint8 B[32]; + uint8 g_len; + uint8 g[1]; + uint8 N_len; + uint8 N[32]; + uint8 s[32]; + uint8 unk3[16]; +} sAuthLogonChallenge_S; +*/ + +typedef struct AUTH_LOGON_PROOF_C +{ + uint8 cmd; + uint8 A[32]; + uint8 M1[20]; + uint8 crc_hash[20]; + uint8 number_of_keys; + uint8 unk; // Added in 1.12.x client branch +} sAuthLogonProof_C; +/* +typedef struct +{ + uint16 unk1; + uint32 unk2; + uint8 unk3[4]; + uint16 unk4[20]; +} sAuthLogonProofKey_C; +*/ +typedef struct AUTH_LOGON_PROOF_S +{ + uint8 cmd; + uint8 error; + uint8 M2[20]; + uint32 unk1; + uint32 unk2; + uint16 unk3; +} sAuthLogonProof_S; + +typedef struct XFER_INIT +{ + uint8 cmd; // XFER_INITIATE + uint8 fileNameLen; // strlen(fileName); + uint8 fileName[1]; // fileName[fileNameLen] + uint64 file_size; // file size (bytes) + uint8 md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; // MD5 +}XFER_INIT; + +typedef struct XFER_DATA +{ + uint8 opcode; + uint16 data_size; + uint8 data[ChunkSize]; +}XFER_DATA_STRUCT; + +typedef struct AuthHandler +{ + eAuthCmd cmd; + uint32 status; + bool (AuthSocket::*handler)(void); +}AuthHandler; + +// GCC have alternative #pragma pack() syntax and old gcc version not support pack(pop), also any gcc version not support it at some paltform +#if defined( __GNUC__ ) +#pragma pack() +#else +#pragma pack(pop) +#endif + +/// Launch a thread to transfer a patch to the client +class PatcherRunnable: public ZThread::Runnable +{ + public: + PatcherRunnable(class AuthSocket *); + void run(); + + private: + AuthSocket * mySocket; +}; + +typedef struct PATCH_INFO +{ + uint8 md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; +}PATCH_INFO; + +/// Caches MD5 hash of client patches present on the server +class Patcher +{ + public: + typedef std::map<std::string, PATCH_INFO*> Patches; + ~Patcher(); + Patcher(); + Patches::const_iterator begin() const { return _patches.begin(); } + Patches::const_iterator end() const { return _patches.end(); } + void LoadPatchMD5(char*); + bool GetHash(char * pat,uint8 mymd5[16]); + + private: + void LoadPatchesInfo(); + Patches _patches; +}; + +const AuthHandler table[] = +{ + { AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleLogonChallenge}, + { AUTH_LOGON_PROOF, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleLogonProof }, + { REALM_LIST, STATUS_AUTHED, &AuthSocket::_HandleRealmList }, + { XFER_ACCEPT, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleXferAccept }, + { XFER_RESUME, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleXferResume }, + { XFER_CANCEL, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleXferCancel } +}; + +#define AUTH_TOTAL_COMMANDS sizeof(table)/sizeof(AuthHandler) + +///Holds the MD5 hash of client patches present on the server +Patcher PatchesCache; + +/// Constructor - set the N and g values for SRP6 +AuthSocket::AuthSocket(ISocketHandler &h) : TcpSocket(h) +{ + N.SetHexStr("894B645E89E1535BBDAD5B8B290650530801B18EBFBF5E8FAB3C82872A3E9BB7"); + g.SetDword(7); + _authed = false; + pPatch=NULL; + + _accountSecurityLevel = SEC_PLAYER; +} + +/// Close patch file descriptor before leaving +AuthSocket::~AuthSocket() +{ + if(pPatch) + fclose(pPatch); +} + +/// Accept the connection and set the s random value for SRP6 +void AuthSocket::OnAccept() +{ + sLog.outBasic("Accepting connection from '%s:%d'", + GetRemoteAddress().c_str(), GetRemotePort()); + + s.SetRand(s_BYTE_SIZE * 8); +} + +/// Read the packet from the client +void AuthSocket::OnRead() +{ + ///- Read the packet + TcpSocket::OnRead(); + uint8 _cmd; + while (1) + { + if (!ibuf.GetLength()) + return; + + ///- Get the command out of it + ibuf.SoftRead((char *)&_cmd, 1); // UQ1: No longer exists in new net code ??? + //ibuf.Read((char *)&_cmd, 1); + /*char *command = (char *)malloc(1); + + ibuf.Read(command, 1); + + _cmd = (uint8)command;*/ + // assert(0); + size_t i; + + ///- Circle through known commands and call the correct command handler + for (i=0;i<AUTH_TOTAL_COMMANDS; i++) + { + if ((uint8)table[i].cmd == _cmd && + (table[i].status == STATUS_CONNECTED || + (_authed && table[i].status == STATUS_AUTHED))) + { + DEBUG_LOG("[Auth] got data for cmd %u ibuf length %u", (uint32)_cmd, ibuf.GetLength()); + + if (!(*this.*table[i].handler)()) + { + DEBUG_LOG("Command handler failed for cmd %u ibuf length %u", (uint32)_cmd, ibuf.GetLength()); + return; + } + break; + } + } + + ///- Report unknown commands in the debug log + if (i==AUTH_TOTAL_COMMANDS) + { + DEBUG_LOG("[Auth] got unknown packet %u", (uint32)_cmd); + return; + } + } +} + +/// Make the SRP6 calculation from hash in dB +void AuthSocket::_SetVSFields(std::string rI) +{ + BigNumber I; + I.SetHexStr(rI.c_str()); + + //In case of leading zeroes in the rI hash, restore them + uint8 mDigest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + memset(mDigest,0,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (I.GetNumBytes() <= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) + memcpy(mDigest,I.AsByteArray(),I.GetNumBytes()); + + std::reverse(mDigest,mDigest+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + + Sha1Hash sha; + sha.UpdateData(s.AsByteArray(), s.GetNumBytes()); + sha.UpdateData(mDigest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + sha.Finalize(); + BigNumber x; + x.SetBinary(sha.GetDigest(), sha.GetLength()); + v = g.ModExp(x, N); + // No SQL injection (username escaped) + const char *v_hex, *s_hex; + v_hex = v.AsHexStr(); + s_hex = s.AsHexStr(); + dbRealmServer.PExecute("UPDATE account SET v = '%s', s = '%s' WHERE username = '%s'",v_hex,s_hex, _safelogin.c_str() ); + OPENSSL_free((void*)v_hex); + OPENSSL_free((void*)s_hex); +} + +/// Logon Challenge command handler +bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonChallenge() +{ + DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleLogonChallenge"); + if (ibuf.GetLength() < sizeof(sAuthLogonChallenge_C)) + return false; + + ///- Read the first 4 bytes (header) to get the length of the remaining of the packet + std::vector<uint8> buf; + buf.resize(4); + + ibuf.Read((char *)&buf[0], 4); + + EndianConvert(*((uint16*)(buf[0]))); + uint16 remaining = ((sAuthLogonChallenge_C *)&buf[0])->size; + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] got header, body is %#04x bytes", remaining); + + if ((remaining < sizeof(sAuthLogonChallenge_C) - buf.size()) || (ibuf.GetLength() < remaining)) + return false; + + //No big fear of memory outage (size is int16, i.e. < 65536) + buf.resize(remaining + buf.size() + 1); + buf[buf.size() - 1] = 0; + sAuthLogonChallenge_C *ch = (sAuthLogonChallenge_C*)&buf[0]; + + // BigEndian code, nop in little endian case + // size already converted + EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->gamename[0]))); + EndianConvert(ch->build); + EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->platform[0]))); + EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->os[0]))); + EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->country[0]))); + EndianConvert(ch->timezone_bias); + EndianConvert(ch->ip); + + ///- Read the remaining of the packet + ibuf.Read((char *)&buf[4], remaining); + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] got full packet, %#04x bytes", ch->size); + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] name(%d): '%s'", ch->I_len, ch->I); + + ByteBuffer pkt; + + _login = (const char*)ch->I; + + ///- Normalize account name + //utf8ToUpperOnlyLatin(_login); -- client already send account in expected form + + //Escape the user login to avoid further SQL injection + //Memory will be freed on AuthSocket object destruction + _safelogin=_login; + dbRealmServer.escape_string(_safelogin); + + ///- Check if the client has one of the expected version numbers + bool valid_version=false; + int accepted_versions[]=EXPECTED_MANGOS_CLIENT_BUILD; + for(int i=0;accepted_versions[i];i++) + if(ch->build==accepted_versions[i]) + { + valid_version=true; + break; + } + + /// <ul><li> if this is a valid version + if(valid_version) + { + pkt << (uint8) AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE; + pkt << (uint8) 0x00; + + ///- Verify that this IP is not in the ip_banned table + // No SQL injection possible (paste the IP address as passed by the socket) + dbRealmServer.Execute("DELETE FROM ip_banned WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate"); + + std::string address = GetRemoteAddress(); + dbRealmServer.escape_string(address); + QueryResult *result = dbRealmServer.PQuery( "SELECT * FROM ip_banned WHERE ip = '%s'",address.c_str()); + if(result) + { + pkt << (uint8)REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_BANNED; + sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned ip %s tries to login!",GetRemoteAddress().c_str ()); + delete result; + } + else + { + ///- Get the account details from the account table + // No SQL injection (escaped user name) + + result = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT sha_pass_hash,id,locked,last_ip,gmlevel FROM account WHERE username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str ()); + if( result ) + { + ///- If the IP is 'locked', check that the player comes indeed from the correct IP address + bool locked = false; + if((*result)[2].GetUInt8() == 1) // if ip is locked + { + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is locked to IP - '%s'", _login.c_str(), (*result)[3].GetString()); + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Player address is '%s'", GetRemoteAddress().c_str()); + if ( strcmp((*result)[3].GetString(),GetRemoteAddress().c_str()) ) + { + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP differs"); + pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_FREEZED; + locked=true; + } + else + { + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP matches"); + } + } + else + { + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is not locked to ip", _login.c_str()); + } + + if (!locked) + { + //set expired bans to inactive + dbRealmServer.Execute("UPDATE account_banned SET active = 0 WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate"); + ///- If the account is banned, reject the logon attempt + QueryResult *banresult = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT bandate,unbandate FROM account_banned WHERE id = %u AND active = 1", (*result)[1].GetUInt32()); + if(banresult) + { + if((*banresult)[0].GetUInt64() == (*banresult)[1].GetUInt64()) + { + pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_BANNED; + sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ()); + } + else + { + pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_ACCOUNT_FREEZED; + sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Temporarily banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ()); + } + + delete banresult; + } + else + { + ///- Get the password from the account table, upper it, and make the SRP6 calculation + std::string rI = (*result)[0].GetCppString(); + _SetVSFields(rI); + + b.SetRand(19 * 8); + BigNumber gmod=g.ModExp(b, N); + B = ((v * 3) + gmod) % N; + + ASSERT(gmod.GetNumBytes() <= 32); + + BigNumber unk3; + unk3.SetRand(16*8); + + ///- Fill the response packet with the result + pkt << (uint8)REALM_AUTH_SUCCESS; + + // B may be calculated < 32B so we force minnimal length to 32B + pkt.append(B.AsByteArray(32), 32); // 32 bytes + pkt << (uint8)1; + pkt.append(g.AsByteArray(), 1); + pkt << (uint8)32; + pkt.append(N.AsByteArray(), 32); + pkt.append(s.AsByteArray(), s.GetNumBytes()); // 32 bytes + pkt.append(unk3.AsByteArray(), 16); + pkt << (uint8)0; // Added in 1.12.x client branch + + uint8 secLevel = (*result)[4].GetUInt8(); + _accountSecurityLevel = secLevel <= SEC_ADMINISTRATOR ? AccountTypes(secLevel) : SEC_ADMINISTRATOR; + + std::string localeName; + localeName.resize(4); + for(int i = 0; i <4; ++i) + localeName[i] = ch->country[4-i-1]; + + _localization = GetLocaleByName(localeName); + + sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s is using '%c%c%c%c' locale (%u)", _login.c_str (), ch->country[3],ch->country[2],ch->country[1],ch->country[0], _localization); + } + } + delete result; + } + else //no account + { + pkt<< (uint8) REALM_AUTH_NO_MATCH; + } + } + } //valid version + else + ///<li> else + { + ///- Check if we have the apropriate patch on the disk + char tmp[64]; + // No buffer overflow (fixed length of arguments) + sprintf(tmp,"./patches/%d%c%c%c%c.mpq",ch->build,ch->country[3], + ch->country[2],ch->country[1],ch->country[0]); + // This will be closed at the destruction of the AuthSocket (client deconnection) + FILE *pFile=fopen(tmp,"rb"); + if(!pFile) + { + pkt << (uint8) AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE; + pkt << (uint8) 0x00; + pkt << (uint8) REALM_AUTH_WRONG_BUILD_NUMBER; + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] %u is not a valid client version!", ch->build); + DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Patch %s not found",tmp); + }else + { //have patch + pPatch=pFile; + XFER_INIT xferh; + + ///- Get the MD5 hash of the patch file (get it from preloaded Patcher cache or calculate it) + if(PatchesCache.GetHash(tmp,(uint8*)&xferh.md5)) + { + DEBUG_LOG("\n[AuthChallenge] Found precached patch info for patch %s",tmp); + } + else + { //calculate patch md5 + printf("\n[AuthChallenge] Patch info for %s was not cached.",tmp); + PatchesCache.LoadPatchMD5(tmp); + PatchesCache.GetHash(tmp,(uint8*)&xferh.md5); + } + + ///- Send a packet to the client with the file length and MD5 hash + uint8 data[2]={AUTH_LOGON_PROOF,REALM_AUTH_UPDATE_CLIENT}; + SendBuf((const char*)data,sizeof(data)); + + memcpy(&xferh,"0\x05Patch",7); + xferh.cmd=XFER_INITIATE; + fseek(pPatch,0,SEEK_END); + xferh.file_size=ftell(pPatch); + + SendBuf((const char*)&xferh,sizeof(xferh)); + return true; + } + } + /// </ul> + SendBuf((char const*)pkt.contents(), pkt.size()); + return true; +} + +/// Logon Proof command handler +bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonProof() +{ + DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleLogonProof"); + ///- Read the packet + if (ibuf.GetLength() < sizeof(sAuthLogonProof_C)) + return false; + + sAuthLogonProof_C lp; + ibuf.Read((char *)&lp, sizeof(sAuthLogonProof_C)); + + ///- Continue the SRP6 calculation based on data received from the client + BigNumber A; + A.SetBinary(lp.A, 32); + + Sha1Hash sha; + sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&A, &B, NULL); + sha.Finalize(); + BigNumber u; + u.SetBinary(sha.GetDigest(), 20); + BigNumber S = (A * (v.ModExp(u, N))).ModExp(b, N); + + uint8 t[32]; + uint8 t1[16]; + uint8 vK[40]; + memcpy(t, S.AsByteArray(), 32); + for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) + { + t1[i] = t[i*2]; + } + sha.Initialize(); + sha.UpdateData(t1, 16); + sha.Finalize(); + for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) + { + vK[i*2] = sha.GetDigest()[i]; + } + for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) + { + t1[i] = t[i*2+1]; + } + sha.Initialize(); + sha.UpdateData(t1, 16); + sha.Finalize(); + for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) + { + vK[i*2+1] = sha.GetDigest()[i]; + } + K.SetBinary(vK, 40); + + uint8 hash[20]; + + sha.Initialize(); + sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&N, NULL); + sha.Finalize(); + memcpy(hash, sha.GetDigest(), 20); + sha.Initialize(); + sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&g, NULL); + sha.Finalize(); + for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) + { + hash[i] ^= sha.GetDigest()[i]; + } + BigNumber t3; + t3.SetBinary(hash, 20); + + sha.Initialize(); + sha.UpdateData(_login); + sha.Finalize(); + uint8 t4[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + memcpy(t4, sha.GetDigest(), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + + sha.Initialize(); + sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&t3, NULL); + sha.UpdateData(t4, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); + sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&s, &A, &B, &K, NULL); + sha.Finalize(); + BigNumber M; + M.SetBinary(sha.GetDigest(), 20); + + ///- Check if SRP6 results match (password is correct), else send an error + if (!memcmp(M.AsByteArray(), lp.M1, 20)) + { + sLog.outBasic("User '%s' successfully authenticated", _login.c_str()); + + ///- Update the sessionkey, last_ip, last login time and reset number of failed logins in the account table for this account + // No SQL injection (escaped user name) and IP address as received by socket + const char* K_hex = K.AsHexStr(); + dbRealmServer.PExecute("UPDATE account SET sessionkey = '%s', last_ip = '%s', last_login = NOW(), locale = '%u', failed_logins = 0 WHERE username = '%s'", K_hex, GetRemoteAddress().c_str(), _localization, _safelogin.c_str() ); + OPENSSL_free((void*)K_hex); + + ///- Finish SRP6 and send the final result to the client + sha.Initialize(); + sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&A, &M, &K, NULL); + sha.Finalize(); + + sAuthLogonProof_S proof; + memcpy(proof.M2, sha.GetDigest(), 20); + proof.cmd = AUTH_LOGON_PROOF; + proof.error = 0; + proof.unk1 = 0x00800000; + proof.unk2 = 0x00; + proof.unk3 = 0x00; + + SendBuf((char *)&proof, sizeof(proof)); + + ///- Set _authed to true! + _authed = true; + } + else + { + char data[4]={AUTH_LOGON_PROOF,REALM_AUTH_NO_MATCH,3,0}; + SendBuf(data,sizeof(data)); + sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s tried to login with wrong password!",_login.c_str ()); + + uint32 MaxWrongPassCount = sConfig.GetIntDefault("WrongPass.MaxCount", 0); + if(MaxWrongPassCount > 0) + { + //Increment number of failed logins by one and if it reaches the limit temporarily ban that account or IP + dbRealmServer.PExecute("UPDATE account SET failed_logins = failed_logins + 1 WHERE username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str()); + + if(QueryResult *loginfail = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT id, failed_logins FROM account WHERE username = '%s'", _safelogin.c_str())) + { + Field* fields = loginfail->Fetch(); + uint32 failed_logins = fields[1].GetUInt32(); + + if( failed_logins >= MaxWrongPassCount ) + { + uint32 WrongPassBanTime = sConfig.GetIntDefault("WrongPass.BanTime", 600); + bool WrongPassBanType = sConfig.GetBoolDefault("WrongPass.BanType", false); + + if(WrongPassBanType) + { + uint32 acc_id = fields[0].GetUInt32(); + dbRealmServer.PExecute("INSERT INTO account_banned VALUES ('%u',UNIX_TIMESTAMP(),UNIX_TIMESTAMP()+'%u','MaNGOS realmd','Failed login autoban',1)", + acc_id, WrongPassBanTime); + sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s got banned for '%u' seconds because it failed to authenticate '%u' times", + _login.c_str(), WrongPassBanTime, failed_logins); + } + else + { + std::string current_ip = GetRemoteAddress(); + dbRealmServer.escape_string(current_ip); + dbRealmServer.PExecute("INSERT INTO ip_banned VALUES ('%s',UNIX_TIMESTAMP(),UNIX_TIMESTAMP()+'%u','MaNGOS realmd','Failed login autoban')", + current_ip.c_str(), WrongPassBanTime); + sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] IP %s got banned for '%u' seconds because account %s failed to authenticate '%u' times", + current_ip.c_str(), WrongPassBanTime, _login.c_str(), failed_logins); + } + } + delete loginfail; + } + } + } + return true; +} + +/// %Realm List command handler +bool AuthSocket::_HandleRealmList() +{ + DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleRealmList"); + if (ibuf.GetLength() < 5) + return false; + + ibuf.Remove(5); + + ///- Get the user id (else close the connection) + // No SQL injection (escaped user name) + + QueryResult *result = dbRealmServer.PQuery("SELECT id,sha_pass_hash FROM account WHERE username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str()); + if(!result) + { + sLog.outError("[ERROR] user %s tried to login and we cannot find him in the database.",_login.c_str()); + SetCloseAndDelete(); + return false; + } + + uint32 id = (*result)[0].GetUInt32(); + std::string rI = (*result)[1].GetCppString(); + delete result; + + ///- Update realm list if need + m_realmList.UpdateIfNeed(); + + ///- Circle through realms in the RealmList and construct the return packet (including # of user characters in each realm) + ByteBuffer pkt; + pkt << (uint32) 0; + pkt << (uint16) m_realmList.size(); + RealmList::RealmMap::const_iterator i; + for( i = m_realmList.begin(); i != m_realmList.end(); i++ ) + { + uint8 AmountOfCharacters; + + // No SQL injection. id of realm is controlled by the database. + result = dbRealmServer.PQuery( "SELECT numchars FROM realmcharacters WHERE realmid = '%d' AND acctid='%u'",i->second.m_ID,id); + if( result ) + { + Field *fields = result->Fetch(); + AmountOfCharacters = fields[0].GetUInt8(); + delete result; + } + else + AmountOfCharacters = 0; + + uint8 lock = (i->second.allowedSecurityLevel > _accountSecurityLevel) ? 1 : 0; + + pkt << i->second.icon; // realm type + pkt << lock; // if 1, then realm locked + pkt << i->second.color; // if 2, then realm is offline + pkt << i->first; + pkt << i->second.address; + pkt << i->second.populationLevel; + pkt << AmountOfCharacters; + pkt << i->second.timezone; // realm category + pkt << (uint8) 0x2C; // unk, may be realm number/id? + } + pkt << (uint8) 0x10; + pkt << (uint8) 0x00; + + ByteBuffer hdr; + hdr << (uint8) REALM_LIST; + hdr << (uint16)pkt.size(); + hdr.append(pkt); + + SendBuf((char const*)hdr.contents(), hdr.size()); + + // Set check field before possible relogin to realm + _SetVSFields(rI); + return true; +} + +/// Resume patch transfer +bool AuthSocket::_HandleXferResume() +{ + DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleXferResume"); + ///- Check packet length and patch existence + if (ibuf.GetLength()<9 || !pPatch) + { + sLog.outError("Error while resuming patch transfer (wrong packet)"); + return false; + } + + ///- Launch a PatcherRunnable thread starting at given patch file offset + uint64 start; + ibuf.Remove(1); + ibuf.Read((char*)&start,sizeof(start)); + fseek(pPatch,start,0); + + ZThread::Thread u(new PatcherRunnable(this)); + return true; +} + +/// Cancel patch transfer +bool AuthSocket::_HandleXferCancel() +{ + DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleXferCancel"); + + ///- Close and delete the socket + ibuf.Remove(1); //clear input buffer + + //ZThread::Thread::sleep(15); + SetCloseAndDelete(); + + return true; +} + +/// Accept patch transfer +bool AuthSocket::_HandleXferAccept() +{ + DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleXferAccept"); + + ///- Check packet length and patch existence + if (!pPatch) + { + sLog.outError("Error while accepting patch transfer (wrong packet)"); + return false; + } + + ///- Launch a PatcherRunnable thread, starting at the begining of the patch file + ibuf.Remove(1); //clear input buffer + fseek(pPatch,0,0); + + ZThread::Thread u(new PatcherRunnable(this)); + + return true; +} + +/// Check if there is lag on the connection to the client +bool AuthSocket::IsLag() +{ + return (TCP_BUFSIZE_READ-GetOutputLength()< 2*ChunkSize); +} + +PatcherRunnable::PatcherRunnable(class AuthSocket * as) +{ + mySocket=as; +} + +/// Send content of patch file to the client +void PatcherRunnable::run() +{ + XFER_DATA_STRUCT xfdata; + xfdata.opcode = XFER_DATA; + + while(!feof(mySocket->pPatch) && mySocket->Ready()) + { + ///- Wait until output buffer is reasonably empty + while(mySocket->Ready() && mySocket->IsLag()) + { + ZThread::Thread::sleep(1); + } + ///- And send content of the patch file to the client + xfdata.data_size=fread(&xfdata.data,1,ChunkSize,mySocket->pPatch); + mySocket->SendBuf((const char*)&xfdata,xfdata.data_size +(sizeof(XFER_DATA_STRUCT)-ChunkSize)); + } +} + +/// Preload MD5 hashes of existing patch files on server +#ifndef _WIN32 +#include <sys/dir.h> +#include <errno.h> +void Patcher::LoadPatchesInfo() +{ + DIR * dirp; + //int errno; + struct dirent * dp; + dirp = opendir("./patches/"); + if(!dirp) + return; + while (dirp) + { + errno = 0; + if ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) + { + int l=strlen(dp->d_name); + if(l<8)continue; + if(!memcmp(&dp->d_name[l-4],".mpq",4)) + LoadPatchMD5(dp->d_name); + } + else + { + if(errno != 0) + { + closedir(dirp); + return; + } + break; + } + } + + if(dirp) + closedir(dirp); +} + +#else +void Patcher::LoadPatchesInfo() +{ + WIN32_FIND_DATA fil; + HANDLE hFil=FindFirstFile("./patches/*.mpq",&fil); + if(hFil==INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + return; //no patches were found + + LoadPatchMD5(fil.cFileName); + + while(FindNextFile(hFil,&fil)) + LoadPatchMD5(fil.cFileName); +} +#endif + +/// Calculate and store MD5 hash for a given patch file +void Patcher::LoadPatchMD5(char * szFileName) +{ + ///- Try to open the patch file + std::string path = "./patches/"; + path += szFileName; + FILE * pPatch=fopen(path.c_str(),"rb"); + sLog.outDebug("Loading patch info from %s\n",path.c_str()); + if(!pPatch) + { + sLog.outError("Error loading patch %s\n",path.c_str()); + return; + } + + ///- Calculate the MD5 hash + MD5_CTX ctx; + MD5_Init(&ctx); + uint8* buf = new uint8[512*1024]; + + while (!feof(pPatch)) + { + size_t read = fread(buf, 1, 512*1024, pPatch); + MD5_Update(&ctx, buf, read); + } + delete [] buf; + fclose(pPatch); + + ///- Store the result in the internal patch hash map + _patches[path] = new PATCH_INFO; + MD5_Final((uint8 *)&_patches[path]->md5 , &ctx); +} + +/// Get cached MD5 hash for a given patch file +bool Patcher::GetHash(char * pat,uint8 mymd5[16]) +{ + for( Patches::iterator i = _patches.begin(); i != _patches.end(); i++ ) + if(!stricmp(pat,i->first.c_str () )) + { + memcpy(mymd5,i->second->md5,16); + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/// Launch the patch hashing mechanism on object creation +Patcher::Patcher() +{ + LoadPatchesInfo(); +} + +/// Empty and delete the patch map on termination +Patcher::~Patcher() +{ + for(Patches::iterator i = _patches.begin(); i != _patches.end(); i++ ) + delete i->second; +} |