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-rw-r--r--src/server/authserver/Server/AuthSocket.cpp1069
1 files changed, 1069 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/server/authserver/Server/AuthSocket.cpp b/src/server/authserver/Server/AuthSocket.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..cc293097977
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/server/authserver/Server/AuthSocket.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1069 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 MaNGOS <http://getmangos.com/>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008-2010 Trinity <http://www.trinitycore.org/>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+/** \file
+ \ingroup realmd
+*/
+
+#include "Common.h"
+#include "Database/DatabaseEnv.h"
+#include "ByteBuffer.h"
+#include "Config/ConfigEnv.h"
+#include "Log.h"
+#include "RealmList.h"
+#include "AuthSocket.h"
+#include "AuthCodes.h"
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include "Auth/Sha1.h"
+//#include "Util.h" -- for commented utf8ToUpperOnlyLatin
+
+extern DatabaseType LoginDatabase;
+
+#define ChunkSize 2048
+
+enum eAuthCmd
+{
+ //AUTH_NO_CMD = 0xFF,
+ AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE = 0x00,
+ AUTH_LOGON_PROOF = 0x01,
+ AUTH_RECONNECT_CHALLENGE = 0x02,
+ AUTH_RECONNECT_PROOF = 0x03,
+ //update srv =4
+ REALM_LIST = 0x10,
+ XFER_INITIATE = 0x30,
+ XFER_DATA = 0x31,
+ XFER_ACCEPT = 0x32,
+ XFER_RESUME = 0x33,
+ XFER_CANCEL = 0x34
+};
+
+enum eStatus
+{
+ STATUS_CONNECTED = 0,
+ STATUS_AUTHED
+};
+
+// GCC have alternative #pragma pack(N) syntax and old gcc version not support pack(push,N), also any gcc version not support it at some paltform
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+#pragma pack(1)
+#else
+#pragma pack(push,1)
+#endif
+
+typedef struct AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE_C
+{
+ uint8 cmd;
+ uint8 error;
+ uint16 size;
+ uint8 gamename[4];
+ uint8 version1;
+ uint8 version2;
+ uint8 version3;
+ uint16 build;
+ uint8 platform[4];
+ uint8 os[4];
+ uint8 country[4];
+ uint32 timezone_bias;
+ uint32 ip;
+ uint8 I_len;
+ uint8 I[1];
+} sAuthLogonChallenge_C;
+
+typedef struct AUTH_LOGON_PROOF_C
+{
+ uint8 cmd;
+ uint8 A[32];
+ uint8 M1[20];
+ uint8 crc_hash[20];
+ uint8 number_of_keys;
+ uint8 securityFlags; // 0x00-0x04
+} sAuthLogonProof_C;
+
+typedef struct AUTH_LOGON_PROOF_S
+{
+ uint8 cmd;
+ uint8 error;
+ uint8 M2[20];
+ uint32 unk1;
+ uint32 unk2;
+ uint16 unk3;
+} sAuthLogonProof_S;
+
+typedef struct AUTH_LOGON_PROOF_S_OLD
+{
+ uint8 cmd;
+ uint8 error;
+ uint8 M2[20];
+ //uint32 unk1;
+ uint32 unk2;
+ //uint16 unk3;
+} sAuthLogonProof_S_Old;
+
+typedef struct AUTH_RECONNECT_PROOF_C
+{
+ uint8 cmd;
+ uint8 R1[16];
+ uint8 R2[20];
+ uint8 R3[20];
+ uint8 number_of_keys;
+} sAuthReconnectProof_C;
+
+typedef struct XFER_INIT
+{
+ uint8 cmd; // XFER_INITIATE
+ uint8 fileNameLen; // strlen(fileName);
+ uint8 fileName[5]; // fileName[fileNameLen]
+ uint64 file_size; // file size (bytes)
+ uint8 md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; // MD5
+} XFER_INIT;
+
+typedef struct XFER_DATA
+{
+ uint8 opcode;
+ uint16 data_size;
+ uint8 data[ChunkSize];
+} XFER_DATA_STRUCT;
+
+typedef struct AuthHandler
+{
+ eAuthCmd cmd;
+ uint32 status;
+ bool (AuthSocket::*handler)(void);
+} AuthHandler;
+
+// GCC have alternative #pragma pack() syntax and old gcc version not support pack(pop), also any gcc version not support it at some paltform
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+#pragma pack()
+#else
+#pragma pack(pop)
+#endif
+
+/// Launch a thread to transfer a patch to the client
+class PatcherRunnable: public ACE_Based::Runnable
+{
+ public:
+ PatcherRunnable(class AuthSocket *);
+ void run();
+
+ private:
+ AuthSocket * mySocket;
+};
+
+typedef struct PATCH_INFO
+{
+ uint8 md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+} PATCH_INFO;
+
+/// Caches MD5 hash of client patches present on the server
+class Patcher
+{
+ public:
+ typedef std::map<std::string, PATCH_INFO*> Patches;
+ ~Patcher();
+ Patcher();
+ Patches::const_iterator begin() const { return _patches.begin(); }
+ Patches::const_iterator end() const { return _patches.end(); }
+ void LoadPatchMD5(char*);
+ bool GetHash(char * pat,uint8 mymd5[16]);
+
+ private:
+ void LoadPatchesInfo();
+ Patches _patches;
+};
+
+const AuthHandler table[] =
+{
+ { AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleLogonChallenge },
+ { AUTH_LOGON_PROOF, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleLogonProof },
+ { AUTH_RECONNECT_CHALLENGE, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleReconnectChallenge},
+ { AUTH_RECONNECT_PROOF, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleReconnectProof },
+ { REALM_LIST, STATUS_AUTHED, &AuthSocket::_HandleRealmList },
+ { XFER_ACCEPT, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleXferAccept },
+ { XFER_RESUME, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleXferResume },
+ { XFER_CANCEL, STATUS_CONNECTED, &AuthSocket::_HandleXferCancel }
+};
+
+#define AUTH_TOTAL_COMMANDS sizeof(table)/sizeof(AuthHandler)
+
+///Holds the MD5 hash of client patches present on the server
+Patcher PatchesCache;
+
+/// Constructor - set the N and g values for SRP6
+AuthSocket::AuthSocket(RealmSocket& socket) : socket_(socket)
+{
+ N.SetHexStr("894B645E89E1535BBDAD5B8B290650530801B18EBFBF5E8FAB3C82872A3E9BB7");
+ g.SetDword(7);
+ _authed = false;
+ _accountSecurityLevel = SEC_PLAYER;
+}
+
+/// Close patch file descriptor before leaving
+AuthSocket::~AuthSocket(void)
+{
+}
+
+/// Accept the connection and set the s random value for SRP6
+void AuthSocket::OnAccept(void)
+{
+ sLog.outBasic("Accepting connection from '%s'", socket().get_remote_address().c_str());
+}
+
+void AuthSocket::OnClose(void)
+{
+ sLog.outDebug("AuthSocket::OnClose");
+}
+
+/// Read the packet from the client
+void AuthSocket::OnRead()
+{
+ uint8 _cmd;
+ while (1)
+ {
+ if (!socket().recv_soft((char *)&_cmd, 1))
+ return;
+
+ size_t i;
+
+ ///- Circle through known commands and call the correct command handler
+ for (i = 0; i < AUTH_TOTAL_COMMANDS; ++i)
+ {
+ if ((uint8)table[i].cmd == _cmd &&
+ (table[i].status == STATUS_CONNECTED ||
+ (_authed && table[i].status == STATUS_AUTHED)))
+ {
+ DEBUG_LOG("[Auth] got data for cmd %u recv length %u", (uint32)_cmd, (uint32)socket().recv_len());
+
+ if (!(*this.*table[i].handler)())
+ {
+ DEBUG_LOG("Command handler failed for cmd %u recv length %u", (uint32)_cmd, (uint32)socket().recv_len());
+ return;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Report unknown packets in the error log
+ if (i == AUTH_TOTAL_COMMANDS)
+ {
+ sLog.outError("[Auth] got unknown packet from '%s'", socket().get_remote_address().c_str());
+ socket().shutdown();
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Make the SRP6 calculation from hash in dB
+void AuthSocket::_SetVSFields(const std::string& rI)
+{
+ s.SetRand(s_BYTE_SIZE * 8);
+
+ BigNumber I;
+ I.SetHexStr(rI.c_str());
+
+ // In case of leading zeros in the rI hash, restore them
+ uint8 mDigest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ memset(mDigest, 0, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (I.GetNumBytes() <= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ memcpy(mDigest, I.AsByteArray(), I.GetNumBytes());
+
+ std::reverse(mDigest, mDigest + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+ Sha1Hash sha;
+ sha.UpdateData(s.AsByteArray(), s.GetNumBytes());
+ sha.UpdateData(mDigest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ BigNumber x;
+ x.SetBinary(sha.GetDigest(), sha.GetLength());
+ v = g.ModExp(x, N);
+ // No SQL injection (username escaped)
+ const char *v_hex, *s_hex;
+ v_hex = v.AsHexStr();
+ s_hex = s.AsHexStr();
+ LoginDatabase.PExecute("UPDATE account SET v = '%s', s = '%s' WHERE username = '%s'", v_hex, s_hex, _safelogin.c_str());
+ OPENSSL_free((void*)v_hex);
+ OPENSSL_free((void*)s_hex);
+}
+
+/// Logon Challenge command handler
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonChallenge()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleLogonChallenge");
+ if (socket().recv_len() < sizeof(sAuthLogonChallenge_C))
+ return false;
+
+ ///- Read the first 4 bytes (header) to get the length of the remaining of the packet
+ std::vector<uint8> buf;
+ buf.resize(4);
+
+ socket().recv((char *)&buf[0], 4);
+
+ EndianConvert(*((uint16*)(buf[0])));
+ uint16 remaining = ((sAuthLogonChallenge_C *)&buf[0])->size;
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] got header, body is %#04x bytes", remaining);
+
+ if ((remaining < sizeof(sAuthLogonChallenge_C) - buf.size()) || (socket().recv_len() < remaining))
+ return false;
+
+ //No big fear of memory outage (size is int16, i.e. < 65536)
+ buf.resize(remaining + buf.size() + 1);
+ buf[buf.size() - 1] = 0;
+ sAuthLogonChallenge_C *ch = (sAuthLogonChallenge_C*)&buf[0];
+
+ ///- Read the remaining of the packet
+ socket().recv((char *)&buf[4], remaining);
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] got full packet, %#04x bytes", ch->size);
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] name(%d): '%s'", ch->I_len, ch->I);
+
+ // BigEndian code, nop in little endian case
+ // size already converted
+ EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->gamename[0])));
+ EndianConvert(ch->build);
+ EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->platform[0])));
+ EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->os[0])));
+ EndianConvert(*((uint32*)(&ch->country[0])));
+ EndianConvert(ch->timezone_bias);
+ EndianConvert(ch->ip);
+
+ ByteBuffer pkt;
+
+ _login = (const char*)ch->I;
+ _build = ch->build;
+ _expversion = (AuthHelper::IsPostBCAcceptedClientBuild(_build) ? POST_BC_EXP_FLAG : NO_VALID_EXP_FLAG) + (AuthHelper::IsPreBCAcceptedClientBuild(_build) ? PRE_BC_EXP_FLAG : NO_VALID_EXP_FLAG);
+
+ ///- Normalize account name
+ //utf8ToUpperOnlyLatin(_login); -- client already send account in expected form
+
+ //Escape the user login to avoid further SQL injection
+ //Memory will be freed on AuthSocket object destruction
+ _safelogin = _login;
+ LoginDatabase.escape_string(_safelogin);
+
+ _build = ch->build;
+
+ pkt << (uint8) AUTH_LOGON_CHALLENGE;
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
+
+ ///- Verify that this IP is not in the ip_banned table
+ // No SQL injection possible (paste the IP address as passed by the socket)
+ LoginDatabase.Execute("DELETE FROM ip_banned WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate");
+
+ std::string address(socket().get_remote_address().c_str());
+ LoginDatabase.escape_string(address);
+ QueryResult_AutoPtr result = LoginDatabase.PQuery("SELECT * FROM ip_banned WHERE ip = '%s'",address.c_str());
+ if (result)
+ {
+ pkt << (uint8)WOW_FAIL_BANNED;
+ sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned ip %s tries to login!", address.c_str ());
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ///- Get the account details from the account table
+ // No SQL injection (escaped user name)
+
+ result = LoginDatabase.PQuery("SELECT a.sha_pass_hash,a.id,a.locked,a.last_ip,aa.gmlevel,a.v,a.s "
+ "FROM account a "
+ "LEFT JOIN account_access aa "
+ "ON (a.id = aa.id) "
+ "WHERE a.username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str ());
+ if (result)
+ {
+ ///- If the IP is 'locked', check that the player comes indeed from the correct IP address
+ bool locked = false;
+ if ((*result)[2].GetUInt8() == 1) // if ip is locked
+ {
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is locked to IP - '%s'", _login.c_str(), (*result)[3].GetString());
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Player address is '%s'", socket().get_remote_address().c_str());
+ if (strcmp((*result)[3].GetString(),socket().get_remote_address().c_str()))
+ {
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP differs");
+ pkt << (uint8) WOW_FAIL_SUSPENDED;
+ locked=true;
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account IP matches");
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG_LOG("[AuthChallenge] Account '%s' is not locked to ip", _login.c_str());
+
+ if (!locked)
+ {
+ //set expired bans to inactive
+ LoginDatabase.Execute("UPDATE account_banned SET active = 0 WHERE unbandate<=UNIX_TIMESTAMP() AND unbandate<>bandate");
+ ///- If the account is banned, reject the logon attempt
+ QueryResult_AutoPtr banresult = LoginDatabase.PQuery("SELECT bandate,unbandate FROM account_banned WHERE id = %u AND active = 1", (*result)[1].GetUInt32());
+ if (banresult)
+ {
+ if ((*banresult)[0].GetUInt64() == (*banresult)[1].GetUInt64())
+ {
+ pkt << (uint8) WOW_FAIL_BANNED;
+ sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ());
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pkt << (uint8) WOW_FAIL_SUSPENDED;
+ sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] Temporarily banned account %s tries to login!",_login.c_str ());
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ///- Get the password from the account table, upper it, and make the SRP6 calculation
+ std::string rI = (*result)[0].GetCppString();
+
+ ///- Don't calculate (v, s) if there are already some in the database
+ std::string databaseV = (*result)[5].GetCppString();
+ std::string databaseS = (*result)[6].GetCppString();
+
+ sLog.outDebug("database authentication values: v='%s' s='%s'", databaseV.c_str(), databaseS.c_str());
+
+ // multiply with 2, bytes are stored as hexstring
+ if (databaseV.size() != s_BYTE_SIZE*2 || databaseS.size() != s_BYTE_SIZE*2)
+ _SetVSFields(rI);
+ else
+ {
+ s.SetHexStr(databaseS.c_str());
+ v.SetHexStr(databaseV.c_str());
+ }
+
+ b.SetRand(19 * 8);
+ BigNumber gmod = g.ModExp(b, N);
+ B = ((v * 3) + gmod) % N;
+
+ ASSERT(gmod.GetNumBytes() <= 32);
+
+ BigNumber unk3;
+ unk3.SetRand(16 * 8);
+
+ ///- Fill the response packet with the result
+ pkt << uint8(WOW_SUCCESS);
+
+ // B may be calculated < 32B so we force minimal length to 32B
+ pkt.append(B.AsByteArray(32), 32); // 32 bytes
+ pkt << uint8(1);
+ pkt.append(g.AsByteArray(), 1);
+ pkt << uint8(32);
+ pkt.append(N.AsByteArray(32), 32);
+ pkt.append(s.AsByteArray(), s.GetNumBytes()); // 32 bytes
+ pkt.append(unk3.AsByteArray(16), 16);
+ uint8 securityFlags = 0;
+ pkt << uint8(securityFlags); // security flags (0x0...0x04)
+
+ if (securityFlags & 0x01) // PIN input
+ {
+ pkt << uint32(0);
+ pkt << uint64(0) << uint64(0); // 16 bytes hash?
+ }
+
+ if (securityFlags & 0x02) // Matrix input
+ {
+ pkt << uint8(0);
+ pkt << uint8(0);
+ pkt << uint8(0);
+ pkt << uint8(0);
+ pkt << uint64(0);
+ }
+
+ if (securityFlags & 0x04) // Security token input
+ pkt << uint8(1);
+
+ uint8 secLevel = (*result)[4].GetUInt8();
+ _accountSecurityLevel = secLevel <= SEC_ADMINISTRATOR ? AccountTypes(secLevel) : SEC_ADMINISTRATOR;
+
+ _localizationName.resize(4);
+ for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
+ _localizationName[i] = ch->country[4-i-1];
+
+ sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s is using '%c%c%c%c' locale (%u)", _login.c_str (), ch->country[3], ch->country[2], ch->country[1], ch->country[0], GetLocaleByName(_localizationName));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else //no account
+ {
+ pkt<< (uint8) WOW_FAIL_UNKNOWN_ACCOUNT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ socket().send((char const*)pkt.contents(), pkt.size());
+ return true;
+}
+
+/// Logon Proof command handler
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleLogonProof()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleLogonProof");
+ ///- Read the packet
+ sAuthLogonProof_C lp;
+
+ if (!socket().recv((char *)&lp, sizeof(sAuthLogonProof_C)))
+ return false;
+
+ /// <ul><li> If the client has no valid version
+ if (_expversion == NO_VALID_EXP_FLAG)
+ {
+ ///- Check if we have the appropriate patch on the disk
+
+ sLog.outDebug("Client with invalid version, patching is not implemented");
+ socket().shutdown();
+ return true;
+ }
+ /// </ul>
+
+ ///- Continue the SRP6 calculation based on data received from the client
+ BigNumber A;
+
+ A.SetBinary(lp.A, 32);
+
+ // SRP safeguard: abort if A==0
+ if (A.isZero())
+ {
+ socket().shutdown();
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ Sha1Hash sha;
+ sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&A, &B, NULL);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ BigNumber u;
+ u.SetBinary(sha.GetDigest(), 20);
+ BigNumber S = (A * (v.ModExp(u, N))).ModExp(b, N);
+
+ uint8 t[32];
+ uint8 t1[16];
+ uint8 vK[40];
+ memcpy(t, S.AsByteArray(32), 32);
+ for (int i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+ {
+ t1[i] = t[i * 2];
+ }
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateData(t1, 16);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i)
+ {
+ vK[i * 2] = sha.GetDigest()[i];
+ }
+ for (int i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
+ {
+ t1[i] = t[i * 2 + 1];
+ }
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateData(t1, 16);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i)
+ {
+ vK[i * 2 + 1] = sha.GetDigest()[i];
+ }
+ K.SetBinary(vK, 40);
+
+ uint8 hash[20];
+
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&N, NULL);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ memcpy(hash, sha.GetDigest(), 20);
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&g, NULL);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i)
+ {
+ hash[i] ^= sha.GetDigest()[i];
+ }
+ BigNumber t3;
+ t3.SetBinary(hash, 20);
+
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateData(_login);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ uint8 t4[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ memcpy(t4, sha.GetDigest(), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&t3, NULL);
+ sha.UpdateData(t4, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&s, &A, &B, &K, NULL);
+ sha.Finalize();
+ BigNumber M;
+ M.SetBinary(sha.GetDigest(), 20);
+
+ ///- Check if SRP6 results match (password is correct), else send an error
+ if (!memcmp(M.AsByteArray(), lp.M1, 20))
+ {
+ sLog.outBasic("User '%s' successfully authenticated", _login.c_str());
+
+ ///- Update the sessionkey, last_ip, last login time and reset number of failed logins in the account table for this account
+ // No SQL injection (escaped user name) and IP address as received by socket
+ const char* K_hex = K.AsHexStr();
+ LoginDatabase.PExecute("UPDATE account SET sessionkey = '%s', last_ip = '%s', last_login = NOW(), locale = '%u', failed_logins = 0 WHERE username = '%s'", K_hex, socket().get_remote_address().c_str(), GetLocaleByName(_localizationName), _safelogin.c_str());
+ OPENSSL_free((void*)K_hex);
+
+ ///- Finish SRP6 and send the final result to the client
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&A, &M, &K, NULL);
+ sha.Finalize();
+
+ if (_expversion & POST_BC_EXP_FLAG)//2.4.3 and 3.1.3 clients (10146 is Chinese build for 3.1.3)
+ {
+ sAuthLogonProof_S proof;
+ memcpy(proof.M2, sha.GetDigest(), 20);
+ proof.cmd = AUTH_LOGON_PROOF;
+ proof.error = 0;
+ proof.unk1 = 0x00800000;
+ proof.unk2 = 0x00;
+ proof.unk3 = 0x00;
+ socket().send((char *)&proof, sizeof(proof));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sAuthLogonProof_S_Old proof;
+ memcpy(proof.M2, sha.GetDigest(), 20);
+ proof.cmd = AUTH_LOGON_PROOF;
+ proof.error = 0;
+ //proof.unk1 = 0x00800000;
+ proof.unk2 = 0x00;
+ //proof.unk3 = 0x00;
+ socket().send((char *)&proof, sizeof(proof));
+ }
+
+ ///- Set _authed to true!
+ _authed = true;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ char data[4]= { AUTH_LOGON_PROOF, WOW_FAIL_UNKNOWN_ACCOUNT, 3, 0};
+ socket().send(data, sizeof(data));
+ sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s tried to login with wrong password!",_login.c_str ());
+
+ uint32 MaxWrongPassCount = sConfig.GetIntDefault("WrongPass.MaxCount", 0);
+ if (MaxWrongPassCount > 0)
+ {
+ //Increment number of failed logins by one and if it reaches the limit temporarily ban that account or IP
+ LoginDatabase.PExecute("UPDATE account SET failed_logins = failed_logins + 1 WHERE username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str());
+
+ if (QueryResult_AutoPtr loginfail = LoginDatabase.PQuery("SELECT id, failed_logins FROM account WHERE username = '%s'", _safelogin.c_str()))
+ {
+ Field* fields = loginfail->Fetch();
+ uint32 failed_logins = fields[1].GetUInt32();
+
+ if (failed_logins >= MaxWrongPassCount)
+ {
+ uint32 WrongPassBanTime = sConfig.GetIntDefault("WrongPass.BanTime", 600);
+ bool WrongPassBanType = sConfig.GetBoolDefault("WrongPass.BanType", false);
+
+ if (WrongPassBanType)
+ {
+ uint32 acc_id = fields[0].GetUInt32();
+ LoginDatabase.PExecute("INSERT INTO account_banned VALUES ('%u',UNIX_TIMESTAMP(),UNIX_TIMESTAMP()+'%u','Trinity realmd','Failed login autoban',1)",
+ acc_id, WrongPassBanTime);
+ sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] account %s got banned for '%u' seconds because it failed to authenticate '%u' times",
+ _login.c_str(), WrongPassBanTime, failed_logins);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ std::string current_ip(socket().get_remote_address().c_str());
+ LoginDatabase.escape_string(current_ip);
+ LoginDatabase.PExecute("INSERT INTO ip_banned VALUES ('%s',UNIX_TIMESTAMP(),UNIX_TIMESTAMP()+'%u','Trinity realmd','Failed login autoban')",
+ current_ip.c_str(), WrongPassBanTime);
+ sLog.outBasic("[AuthChallenge] IP %s got banned for '%u' seconds because account %s failed to authenticate '%u' times",
+ current_ip.c_str(), WrongPassBanTime, _login.c_str(), failed_logins);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/// Reconnect Challenge command handler
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleReconnectChallenge()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleReconnectChallenge");
+ if (socket().recv_len() < sizeof(sAuthLogonChallenge_C))
+ return false;
+
+ ///- Read the first 4 bytes (header) to get the length of the remaining of the packet
+ std::vector<uint8> buf;
+ buf.resize(4);
+
+ socket().recv((char *)&buf[0], 4);
+
+ EndianConvert(*((uint16*)(buf[0])));
+ uint16 remaining = ((sAuthLogonChallenge_C *)&buf[0])->size;
+ DEBUG_LOG("[ReconnectChallenge] got header, body is %#04x bytes", remaining);
+
+ if ((remaining < sizeof(sAuthLogonChallenge_C) - buf.size()) || (socket().recv_len() < remaining))
+ return false;
+
+ //No big fear of memory outage (size is int16, i.e. < 65536)
+ buf.resize(remaining + buf.size() + 1);
+ buf[buf.size() - 1] = 0;
+ sAuthLogonChallenge_C *ch = (sAuthLogonChallenge_C*)&buf[0];
+
+ ///- Read the remaining of the packet
+ socket().recv((char *)&buf[4], remaining);
+ DEBUG_LOG("[ReconnectChallenge] got full packet, %#04x bytes", ch->size);
+ DEBUG_LOG("[ReconnectChallenge] name(%d): '%s'", ch->I_len, ch->I);
+
+ _login = (const char*)ch->I;
+ _safelogin = _login;
+
+ QueryResult_AutoPtr result = LoginDatabase.PQuery ("SELECT sessionkey FROM account WHERE username = '%s'", _safelogin.c_str ());
+
+ // Stop if the account is not found
+ if (!result)
+ {
+ sLog.outError("[ERROR] user %s tried to login and we cannot find his session key in the database.", _login.c_str());
+ socket().shutdown();
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ Field* fields = result->Fetch ();
+ K.SetHexStr (fields[0].GetString ());
+
+ ///- Sending response
+ ByteBuffer pkt;
+ pkt << (uint8) AUTH_RECONNECT_CHALLENGE;
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
+ _reconnectProof.SetRand(16 * 8);
+ pkt.append(_reconnectProof.AsByteArray(16), 16); // 16 bytes random
+ pkt << (uint64) 0x00 << (uint64) 0x00; // 16 bytes zeros
+ socket().send((char const*)pkt.contents(), pkt.size());
+ return true;
+}
+
+/// Reconnect Proof command handler
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleReconnectProof()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleReconnectProof");
+ ///- Read the packet
+ sAuthReconnectProof_C lp;
+ if (!socket().recv((char *)&lp, sizeof(sAuthReconnectProof_C)))
+ return false;
+
+ if (_login.empty() || !_reconnectProof.GetNumBytes() || !K.GetNumBytes())
+ return false;
+
+ BigNumber t1;
+ t1.SetBinary(lp.R1, 16);
+
+ Sha1Hash sha;
+ sha.Initialize();
+ sha.UpdateData(_login);
+ sha.UpdateBigNumbers(&t1, &_reconnectProof, &K, NULL);
+ sha.Finalize();
+
+ if (!memcmp(sha.GetDigest(), lp.R2, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ {
+ ///- Sending response
+ ByteBuffer pkt;
+ pkt << (uint8) AUTH_RECONNECT_PROOF;
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
+ pkt << (uint16) 0x00; // 2 bytes zeros
+ socket().send((char const*)pkt.contents(), pkt.size());
+
+ ///- Set _authed to true!
+ _authed = true;
+
+ return true;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sLog.outError("[ERROR] user %s tried to login, but session invalid.", _login.c_str());
+ socket().shutdown();
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+/// %Realm List command handler
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleRealmList()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleRealmList");
+ if (socket().recv_len() < 5)
+ return false;
+
+ socket().recv_skip(5);
+
+ ///- Get the user id (else close the connection)
+ // No SQL injection (escaped user name)
+
+ QueryResult_AutoPtr result = LoginDatabase.PQuery("SELECT id FROM account WHERE username = '%s'",_safelogin.c_str());
+ if (!result)
+ {
+ sLog.outError("[ERROR] user %s tried to login and we cannot find him in the database.",_login.c_str());
+ socket().shutdown();
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ uint32 id = (*result)[0].GetUInt32();
+
+ ///- Update realm list if need
+ sRealmList->UpdateIfNeed();
+
+ ///- Circle through realms in the RealmList and construct the return packet (including # of user characters in each realm)
+ ByteBuffer pkt;
+
+ size_t RealmListSize = 0;
+ for (RealmList::RealmMap::const_iterator i = sRealmList->begin(); i != sRealmList->end(); ++i)
+ {
+ // don't work with realms which not compatible with the client
+ if (_expversion & POST_BC_EXP_FLAG) // 2.4.3 and 3.1.3 cliens
+ {
+ if (i->second.gamebuild != _build)
+ continue;
+ }
+ else if (_expversion & PRE_BC_EXP_FLAG) // 1.12.1 and 1.12.2 clients are compatible with eachother
+ {
+ if (!AuthHelper::IsPreBCAcceptedClientBuild(i->second.gamebuild))
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ uint8 AmountOfCharacters;
+
+ // No SQL injection. id of realm is controlled by the database.
+ result = LoginDatabase.PQuery("SELECT numchars FROM realmcharacters WHERE realmid = '%d' AND acctid='%u'",i->second.m_ID,id);
+ if (result)
+ {
+ Field *fields = result->Fetch();
+ AmountOfCharacters = fields[0].GetUInt8();
+ }
+ else
+ AmountOfCharacters = 0;
+
+ uint8 lock = (i->second.allowedSecurityLevel > _accountSecurityLevel) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ pkt << i->second.icon; // realm type
+ if ( _expversion & POST_BC_EXP_FLAG )//only 2.4.3 and 3.1.3 cliens
+ pkt << lock; // if 1, then realm locked
+ pkt << i->second.color; // if 2, then realm is offline
+ pkt << i->first;
+ pkt << i->second.address;
+ pkt << i->second.populationLevel;
+ pkt << AmountOfCharacters;
+ pkt << i->second.timezone; // realm category
+ if ( _expversion & POST_BC_EXP_FLAG )//2.4.3 and 3.1.3 clients
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x2C; // unk, may be realm number/id?
+ else
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x0; //1.12.1 and 1.12.2 clients
+
+ ++RealmListSize;
+ }
+
+ if ( _expversion & POST_BC_EXP_FLAG )//2.4.3 and 3.1.3 cliens
+ {
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x10;
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
+ }else{//1.12.1 and 1.12.2 clients
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x00;
+ pkt << (uint8) 0x02;
+ }
+
+ // make a ByteBuffer which stores the RealmList's size
+ ByteBuffer RealmListSizeBuffer;
+ RealmListSizeBuffer << (uint32)0;
+ if (_expversion & POST_BC_EXP_FLAG) // only 2.4.3 and 3.1.3 cliens
+ RealmListSizeBuffer << (uint16)RealmListSize;
+ else
+ RealmListSizeBuffer << (uint32)RealmListSize;
+
+ ByteBuffer hdr;
+ hdr << (uint8) REALM_LIST;
+ hdr << (uint16)(pkt.size() + RealmListSizeBuffer.size());
+ hdr.append(RealmListSizeBuffer); // append RealmList's size buffer
+ hdr.append(pkt); // append realms in the realmlist
+
+ socket().send((char const*)hdr.contents(), hdr.size());
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/// Resume patch transfer
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleXferResume()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleXferResume");
+ ///- Check packet length and patch existence
+ if (socket().recv_len() < 9 || !pPatch)
+ {
+ sLog.outError("Error while resuming patch transfer (wrong packet)");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ///- Launch a PatcherRunnable thread starting at given patch file offset
+ uint64 start;
+ socket().recv_skip(1);
+ socket().recv((char*)&start,sizeof(start));
+ fseek(pPatch, start, 0);
+
+ ACE_Based::Thread u(new PatcherRunnable(this));
+ return true;
+}
+
+/// Cancel patch transfer
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleXferCancel()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleXferCancel");
+
+ ///- Close and delete the socket
+ socket().recv_skip(1); //clear input buffer
+
+ socket().shutdown();
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/// Accept patch transfer
+bool AuthSocket::_HandleXferAccept()
+{
+ DEBUG_LOG("Entering _HandleXferAccept");
+
+ ///- Check packet length and patch existence
+ if (!pPatch)
+ {
+ sLog.outError("Error while accepting patch transfer (wrong packet)");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ///- Launch a PatcherRunnable thread, starting at the beginning of the patch file
+ socket().recv_skip(1); // clear input buffer
+ fseek(pPatch, 0, 0);
+
+ ACE_Based::Thread u(new PatcherRunnable(this));
+ return true;
+}
+
+PatcherRunnable::PatcherRunnable(class AuthSocket * as)
+{
+ mySocket = as;
+}
+
+/// Send content of patch file to the client
+void PatcherRunnable::run()
+{
+}
+
+/// Preload MD5 hashes of existing patch files on server
+#ifndef _WIN32
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+void Patcher::LoadPatchesInfo()
+{
+ DIR * dirp;
+ //int errno;
+ struct dirent * dp;
+ dirp = opendir("./patches/");
+ if (!dirp)
+ return;
+ while (dirp)
+ {
+ errno = 0;
+ if ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL)
+ {
+ int l = strlen(dp->d_name);
+ if (l < 8)
+ continue;
+ if (!memcmp(&dp->d_name[l-4],".mpq",4))
+ LoadPatchMD5(dp->d_name);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (errno != 0)
+ {
+ closedir(dirp);
+ return;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (dirp)
+ closedir(dirp);
+}
+
+#else
+void Patcher::LoadPatchesInfo()
+{
+ WIN32_FIND_DATA fil;
+ HANDLE hFil=FindFirstFile("./patches/*.mpq", &fil);
+ if (hFil == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ return; // no patches were found
+
+ do
+ {
+ LoadPatchMD5(fil.cFileName);
+ }
+ while(FindNextFile(hFil, &fil));
+}
+#endif
+
+/// Calculate and store MD5 hash for a given patch file
+void Patcher::LoadPatchMD5(char * szFileName)
+{
+ ///- Try to open the patch file
+ std::string path = "./patches/";
+ path += szFileName;
+ FILE *pPatch = fopen(path.c_str(), "rb");
+ sLog.outDebug("Loading patch info from %s\n", path.c_str());
+ if (!pPatch)
+ {
+ sLog.outError("Error loading patch %s\n", path.c_str());
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ///- Calculate the MD5 hash
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ MD5_Init(&ctx);
+ uint8* buf = new uint8[512*1024];
+
+ while (!feof(pPatch))
+ {
+ size_t read = fread(buf, 1, 512*1024, pPatch);
+ MD5_Update(&ctx, buf, read);
+ }
+ delete [] buf;
+ fclose(pPatch);
+
+ ///- Store the result in the internal patch hash map
+ _patches[path] = new PATCH_INFO;
+ MD5_Final((uint8 *)&_patches[path]->md5, &ctx);
+}
+
+/// Get cached MD5 hash for a given patch file
+bool Patcher::GetHash(char * pat, uint8 mymd5[16])
+{
+ for (Patches::iterator i = _patches.begin(); i != _patches.end(); ++i)
+ if (!stricmp(pat, i->first.c_str()))
+ {
+ memcpy(mymd5, i->second->md5, 16);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/// Launch the patch hashing mechanism on object creation
+Patcher::Patcher()
+{
+ LoadPatchesInfo();
+}
+
+/// Empty and delete the patch map on termination
+Patcher::~Patcher()
+{
+ for (Patches::iterator i = _patches.begin(); i != _patches.end(); ++i)
+ delete i->second;
+}